Proposal to introduce provisions relating to

• Manipulation Devices and Strategies that were previously in the 09 series of amendments to UN R83,
• the levels to which certain provisions apply,
• clarifications and corrections to the requirements for the laboratory test for pure electric range ratio at low temperature for Pure Electric Vehicles
• an update to allow the use in Levels 1A and 2 of actual tyre rolling resistance values to calculate the final road load coefficient for the individual vehicles, and
• align the Regulation with the current regional status and the current state-of-the-art.

Proposal to remove the provisions relating to manipulation devices and manipulation strategies that are being moved to UN R154 and clarify that in-service conformity checks for electric range of pure electric vehicles at low temperatures are optional.

Proposal from the ADAS task force to extend the provisions clarifying the scope between this Regulation and UN R171 for the ACSF categories B1, B2, C, D, E to ACSF category A.

Proposal to revise the transitional provisions and provisions on continued compliance with Safety Management Systems provisions.

Proposal from the GRSG task force on Automated Vehicles Regulation Screening to enable the application of UN R122 to ADS vehicles and to ensure that the requirements minimise the risk of burns across all vehicle occupants.

Proposal concerning “detected objects” and data element precision.

Proposal concerning “detected objects” and data element precision for the ADS regulation provisions on DSSAD.

Provides corrections and updates to the requirements, including to reflect the fact that requirements for manipulation devices and manipulation strategies

The proposal revises UN R10 paragraphs 3.1.8, 6.10.7 to clarify that intentional emissions from approved RF transmitters are excluded from emission limits when installed per manufacturer instructions without modification. New paragraph 3.1.9 requires risk assessment documentation for radio equipment installations.

Proposal to amend UN R158 to include category O vehicles (trailers) within the scope of regulations for devices enabling driver awareness of vulnerable road users during reversing. The amendment aims to reduce safety risks to vulnerable road users when category O vehicles reverse. Amendments modify title, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 12.3, 12.4, and Annex 4, and introduce transitional provisions starting from September 2028. Justification includes casualty data showing seven fatalities and 15 serious injuries over 10 years from vehicles towing trailers reversing into vulnerable road users, plus a coroner’s recommendation for reversing cameras on all vehicles.

This document presents an initial concept for approvals of devices as components or separate technical units according to UN R155, and the installation of such devices on vehicles already holding UN R155 approval, based on Supplement 3 to the original series. The regulation applies to vehicles of categories L₁–L₇, M₁–M₃, N₁–N₃, and O₁–O₄ with electronic control units, and to approval of components and separate technical units with regard to their cyber security. Approval authorities shall grant type approval only to vehicle or electrical/electronic sub-assembly types that satisfy the regulation’s requirements through document checks and testing. Manufacturers must demonstrate cyber security management systems covering development, production, and post-production phases, including risk assessment, mitigation implementation, monitoring, and response to cyber-attacks. Certificates of Compliance for Cyber Security Management Systems remain valid for three years.

TFCS-37-08 presents proposals to amend UN R155 to establish approval routes for electrical/electronic sub-assemblies and separate technical units. The regulation introduces three parts: Part I covers vehicle cyber security approval; Part II covers component and separate technical unit approval; Part III covers installation approval of approved components and separate technical units in vehicles. Updates include new definitions, application procedures by manufacturers or their representatives, approval conditions specifying connection limitations, and cyber security management system requirements. The proposal requests colleague review and feedback.

UN R155 addresses operator risks in automated driving systems. The ADS Regulation enables operators to offer services using automation and permits remote termination of the ADS. UN R155 mandates that supplier-related risks are managed, but operators are customers, not suppliers, creating downstream risks. An automated vehicle could be susceptible to unauthorised requests from an operator experiencing cyber attack. UN R155 does not define how downstream organisational risks are managed. Manufacturers should identify risks posed by operators and inform Third Party Operators of risks involved and expected minimum-security controls for workstations interfacing with an ADS. This could be achieved via Annex 5.

Proposal to amend Table A1 of Annex 5 to include high level and sub-level descriptions of vulnerability and threat including spoofing of messages, Sybil attacks, communication channels permitting code injection, manipulation, overwrite and erasure of vehicle held data and code, denial of service attacks, unauthorized access to vehicle systems, viruses in communication media, and malicious messages, and amend Table B1 of Annex 5 to provide corresponding mitigation measures. This proposal is a further elaboration of TFCS-35-07.

The Task Force on Substitutes/Retrofits reports progress on LED substitutes and retrofits. Actions completed include Step 1 on LED Substitutes and Step 2 on LED Replacements covering administrative and technical items. The Front Fog cluster H8, H16, HB4 was approved by WP29 in March 2026 and entered into force. Current focus is the High Beam cluster HB3, HIR2, H9 and H10, with technical discussions ongoing in GTB WGLS and H10 LEDr draft category sheet submitted. Market surveillance requires improvement across control points from manufacturer to road-side enforcement.

Category H10 sheet defines LED light source H10_LEDr dimensions, electrical and photometric characteristics, and measurement requirements. The LED light source shall not exceed the envelope indicated in Figure 2 and shall function in either voltage polarity. Essential characteristics include rated 12 volts, 21 watts, luminous flux 850 lm ± 15%, cap temperature maximum 100°C, and electrical current 1500 mA minimum at 12–14 V DC. The document specifies screen projection requirements using box systems, contrast requirements, and normalized luminous intensity distribution measurements in C-planes per CIE Publication 70-1987.

Germany proposes that the TAA granting UN R155 or UN R156 type approvals shall be obliged to only use CSMS or SUMS certificates signed by the same TAA. Issues identified include that CSMS and SUMS are Management Systems covering entire manufacturers’ organizations, mandating the same TAA will have huge consequences for OEMs using multiple TAAs, and no such obligation exists for ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. A possible way forward in the short term is to keep text unchanged to allow different TAAs for Management Systems CoC and type approval based on voluntary acceptance and implement wording on information exchange and procedure if different TAAs involved.

Proposal to add a new section on Cross-Cutting Organisational and Assurance Risks to AI-07-06. Six risks are proposed: insufficient organisational governance for AI safety management; inadequate definition of roles, responsibilities, and competencies; lack of independence between development and verification activities; degradation of AI safety processes over time; ineffective change management for AI-related artefacts and processes; and inadequate management of AI supply-chain risks. Each risk addresses factors across the lifecycle that can influence the effectiveness of technical AI risk mitigations.

Proposal to amend ADS-20-12 (consolidated guidance document). The terms faults, malfunctions, and abnormalities lack distinct meanings in requirement 6.1.4.2. The revised explanation clarifies that “faults, malfunctions, and abnormalities” do not have specific distinct meanings and cover any failure in the ADS’ capability to perform the DDT within the ODD. The three kinds of issues encompassed are warning signals from other systems, faults without warning signals a driver would perceive, and faults within the ADS itself.

Proposal to amend para. 6.2.2.3.8.1 (b) to change “a driving task relevant area” to “the driving task relevant area” and to expand the accompanying GID text to define the driving task relevant area as consisting of different zones including inside mirror, left outside mirror, right outside mirror, left window, right window, windscreen, and instrument cluster or instrument display, and to clarify that depending on the type of ADS feature and driving situation the user could be suitable to have looked at just one zone or more than one zone.

Proposal to amend Paragraph 5.3.1.3 (GTR) / 7.3.1.3 (UNR) in Safety Case. The revision replaces “no new behaviours or traffic flows” with “no new behaviours or traffic flows density or dynamic element types” and adds “or traffic behaviour” to the text regarding traffic laws because ODD does not include a definition of traffic behaviour, making the original sentence factually incorrect.

Proposal to amend explanation of para. 6.2.2.1.4. to clarify that ‘while’ refers to continuous presentation of information sufficient to enable a user to take over performance of the DDT such as through ambient lighting, tell-tales, or dashboard colour changes. The explanation notes that information on adapted performance is only presented if applicable.

Proposal to amend UN R155 and UN R156 regarding approval authority requirements:

• Add a refusal ground to para. 5.1.3. of UN R155 where the Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System has not been issued by the same approval authority granting type approval
• Insert new para. 5.4. into UN R156 to provide that approval authorities shall not grant any type approval if the Certificate of Compliance for the Software Update Management System has not been issued by the same approval authority granting type approval.

Proposal to revise the guidance on para. 6.1.2.3 of the draft UN Regulation on ADS regarding unreasonable disruption to traffic. The revision changes “prevent normal interaction” to “allow normal interaction” and “require other road users” to “may technically require other road users” to clarify that the requirement permits normal interaction with traffic, such as using on ramps, slowing for traffic lights, and waiting at unprotected turns, where other road users must adapt their speed, without violating the requirement.

Proposal to amend ADS-20-12 (consolidated guidance document). The ADS shall have strategies to detect and respond to instructions from road safety agents. For ADSF-1, this allows transfer of control to the fallback user. Manufacturers may use non-ADS strategies including remote intervention or permitting the road safety agent to drive. Examples of instructions include pull over, give way, stop after collision, move out of way, avoid specific road, and not overtake. Instructions may be issued via lights, sirens, audio messages, written signs, or light bar messages.

Systems with ACSF B2, D and E functionality cannot be approved to UN R79 unless incorporated within a DCAS complying with UN R171. However, these functionalities may exist independently of DCAS, requiring clear distinction. Where not part of DCAS, this must be specified in the EDR regulation. A new EDR data element, “DCAS status”, could encompass ACSF B2, D and E functionalities. These functionalities are now treated either as individual functions or as components of DCAS.

UN R13 and UN R78 establish different brake system requirements for 4-wheel vehicles. R13H requires split service brake systems with front/rear proportioning; R78 permits split service brake systems, combined brake systems, or two separate service brake systems without proportioning requirements. Type-O dry braking tests differ: R13H requires engine disconnected at 100 km/h with stopping distance 0.1v + 0.0060 v² and MFDD 6.43 m/s²; R78 specifies multiple tests at 40, 60, and 100 km/h with varying requirements. Type-I brake fade tests use different snub protocols and performance thresholds. Secondary braking failure criteria differ at specified speeds. R78 requires wet brake testing, a 30 km/h dynamic park brake test with 18% gradient and 5 minutes hold time; R13H specifies static gradient tests. R78 includes detailed ABS, functional safety, and regenerative braking requirements; R13H does not.

Proposal to amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.1. to require the vehicle manufacturer to supplement its statement with an explanation of how the chosen strategy ensures system objectives do not prejudice safe operation of systems referred to and a description of the validation plan, and to require the designated technical service to perform an assessment of the manufacturer’s explanation and validation plan suitability and may perform or require tests as specified in para. 4., and amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.4. to require documentation supported by analysis showing system behaviour on fault occurrence including faults with other systems involved in achieving system function, to establish and maintain analytical approaches open for inspection by the designated technical service at type approval, and to require the designated technical service to perform assessment including inspection of safety approach at concept and system levels and validation plans and results.

Proposal to amend GRVA/2026/13 and the 00 and 01 series of amendments of UN Regulation No. 157, modify the Introduction to remove reference to 60 km/h maximum speed and change “override” to “deactivate”, amend para. 5.1.1. to clarify that the activated system shall be free of unreasonable risks for both vehicle occupants and other road users and shall not cause reasonably foreseeable and preventable collisions, amend para. 10.1.1. to remove reference to foot controls, amend Annex 4 para. 3.5.4. to require manufacturers to report critical incidents to the Type Approval Authority, insert new Annex 4 para. 3.5.4.1. requiring the Type Approval Authority to upload information to DETA within 14 days of receipt, and insert new Annex 7 providing guidance for data exchange via DETA in accordance with para. 3.5.4.1. of Annex 4.

In January 2022, an M₁ passenger vehicle with a detached tyre caused its Anti-lock Braking System to activate, preventing effective braking and resulting in collision with a stationary lorry. The coroner concluded the ABS functioned as intended but created an unsafe scenario by using the fastest rotating wheel as reference speed, and recommended changes to prevent future deaths. The UK proposal to amend UN R13-H would require manufacturers to affirm that strategies to achieve system objectives will not prejudice safe operation of systems under non-fault conditions, including failures of other systems involved in achieving system function such as tyres or wheels, and that documentation be supported by analysis showing how the system will behave upon any fault with bearing on vehicle control, performance, or safety, including faults with other systems involved in achieving system function.

Proposal to amend para. 3.5.1. of Annex 4 to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the approval authority that effective processes, methodologies and tools are in place, up to date and being followed within the organization to manage the safety and continued compliance throughout the product lifecycle, and to demonstrate to the approval authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with these requirements.

Proposal to delete the draft “Reserved” paragraph 5.3.7.2.4.3. in GRVA/2026/18. Reserving paragraph 5.3.7.2.4.3. in the 01 series would mean that the subsequent paragraphs would be out of line with the numbering in the 02 series, making future amendments to UN R171 unnecessarily challenging.

Proposal to amend the original version (GRVA/2026/15), insert para. 5.3.7.2.1.13. to require the manufacturer to describe in the safety concept the system behaviour in case the driver is detected to be disengaged during a manoeuvre; amend the original version and the 01 series (GRVA/2026/15 and GRVA/2026/17), amend para. 3.5.1. of Annex 3 to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the Type Approval Authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with requirements; amend the 01 and 02 series (GRVA/2026/17 and WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 2.3.2. of Appendix 2 of Annex 3; amend the 02 series (WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 4.2.5.2.19.2.1. of Annex 4; and amend the original version, 01 series and 02 series (GRVA/2026/15, GRVA/2026/17 and WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 4.2.5.2.14.1.2. of Annex 4 and para. 4.2.5.2.14.2.1. of Annex 4.

Proposal to amend explanatory text for UNR paragraph 3.2.3. (b) to clarify that the manufacturer should explain how they determine and apply the concept of the safety level of the ADS being at least to the level of a competent and careful human driver, accounting for national specificities, and that there may be different approaches used in applying this concept, including reference driver based approaches and behaviour-based approaches.

The document addresses consistency issues across multiple UN Regulations (R26, R28, R29, R34, R35, R39, R43, R45, R46, R48, R49, R134, R135, R137, R138, R141, R142, R143, R144) concerning automated driving systems. It proposes improved wording for fuel leakage provisions, foot control applicability for vehicles of category M₁, and speedometer requirements when ADS features are active. The document recommends removing duplicate definitions of ADS, DDT, bi-directional vehicle, and forward direction across regulations. It raises questions regarding application to category Y vehicles, handling of bi-directional traffic equipped vehicles, and whether requirements should apply to vehicle users or only when ADS features are active.

Proposal to amend UN R160:

• Amend definitions 2.8., 2.10., and 2.11. to clarify that automatically commanded steering function categories B2, D, and E are not part of a DCAS
• Delete definition 2.25.
• Amend definition 2.35. to simplify non-volatile memory
• Amend para. 2.45. to change service brake terminology
• Amend para. 2.51. to clarify time interval between events
• Amend para. 2.65. to abbreviate vulnerable road user
• Insert new definitions 2.71.–2.83. for rollover protection system, advanced emergency braking system, trigger activated, pre-event synchronization timer, blind spot monitoring system, emergency stop signal, turn signal, acceleration control for pedal error, advanced driver distraction warning system, driver drowsiness and attention warning system, driver control assistance system, and time to collision
• Restructure para. 5.3.1. to distinguish planar, VRU, and rollover events from AEBS events with specified triggers
• Amend para. 5.3.2. to clarify data locking conditions
• Restructure para. 5.3.3. to establish time zero for planar, VRU, rollover, and AEBS events
• Amend para. 5.4.3. to specify side and frontal collision tests
• Amend para. 6.1. to clarify post-crash acceleration measurement
• Insert transitional provisions 12.12.–12.16. providing that as from the official date of entry into force Contracting Parties shall not refuse type-approvals under the 03 series, as from 1 September 2031 or 2029 [date TBD] shall not accept type-approvals to preceding series first issued after that date, until 1 September 2033 shall continue accepting preceding series approvals first issued before 1 September 2031 or 2029 [date TBD], may grant approvals to preceding series, and shall grant extensions of existing approvals
• Amend Annex 4 Table 1 to split engine throttle and accelerator pedal data elements, increase sampling rates to 10 Hz, extend recording intervals for rollover events, add pre-event synchronization timer, trigger activated, ACPE status, ADDW status, DDAW status, blind spot monitoring status, turn signal status, DCAS status, DCAS driver monitoring system warnings, emergency stop signal status, and time to collision data elements, and modify footnotes accordingly

Answers to questions on separate technical unit approvals under UN R155 clarify that a base vehicle must already hold an R155 type approval before an ESA can be added at Part III; approval authorities for different parts may differ with mutual recognition applying; the end of support period for an ESA manufacturer must be communicated to the vehicle manufacturer, with implications to be discussed by the IWG; installation of ESAs must follow vehicle manufacturer instructions without necessarily requiring separate agreement; STU data sharing agreements are required; and after ESA installation, a whole vehicle cyber security risk assessment is not necessary, though Part III must consider risks where ESA and base vehicle interactions occur. A working document is planned for submission to GRVA in January 2027. The IWG will explore whether Part II components may include equipment from certificated base vehicles under UN R155 multi-stage categorization and discuss incorporating STU into original approvals.

Questions address whether minimum vehicle architecture approval should be required before Part III can be used for additional devices; whether approved ESAs can be incorporated in original vehicle approval or as an extension to Part I approval; whether different terminology should replace CSMS for Part III approvals; whether second Part III approvals are permissible for vehicles already approved to Parts I and III; and what implications arise from end-of-support by ESA manufacturers.

Responses to EPPR questionnaire on legislative gaps in the transposition of the GTR 2 into UN R40.

The 7th Edition of IEC CISPR 12 was issued in June 2025, with work commencing on an 8th Edition. Two Special Task Forces are developing updates: one investigating dynamic testing at alternative fixed speeds and acceleration/deceleration modes, and another developing a measurement method for the frequency range 1 GHz to 6 GHz. An 8th Edition CISPR 12 is estimated for issue May–July 2028. For IEC CISPR 36, a Special Task Force concluded that conducted voltage emission measurements are more appropriate than magnetic radiated methods for charging mode testing. A 2nd Edition incorporating conducted voltage charging mode measurements is estimated for issue September–November 2027.

Amend para. AI to replace the heading “Examples of documents/evidence that could be provided” with “Explanation of the requirement” and insert text stating that Part C of this document provides further guidance on the application of the Regulation to vehicles which have been modified by carrying out a transformation of the vehicle.

The document presents vehicle modification use cases categorized into four cases and additional scenarios. Case 1 covers components with negligible risk or cyber-relevant non-automotive devices. Case 2 addresses cyber-relevant automotive devices approved to specific regulatory requirements, requiring installation approval and vehicle type re-approval. Case 3a addresses cyber-relevant devices not approved to specific requirements, requiring component or STU approval. Case 3b covers devices controlling vehicle functions, also requiring component or STU approval. Case 4 encompasses invasive modifications or complex interactions not covered by other cases.

Proposal based on informal document GRVA-25-43 to amend Annex 4, para. 3.5.1. to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the Type Approval Authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with requirements for software and hardware employed in the system. This amendment applies the same principle regarding Safety Management System compliance as specified in UN Regulation No. 171 on Driver Control Assistance Systems.

Proposal to amend UN R155 by inserting new para. 5.1.3.(e) establishing that the Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System shall not be issued by a different Approval Authority than the one granting type approval, and amend UN R156 by inserting new para. 5.4. establishing that Approval Authorities shall not grant type approval if the Certificate of Compliance for the Software Update Management System has not been issued by the same Approval Authority granting type approval. Justification includes ensuring holistic cybersecurity assessment, clarifying reporting obligations under para. 7.2.2.2.(g), addressing unharmonized mutual recognition of management system certificates, maintaining consistency between regulations, and upholding the fundamental principle that approval authorities retain responsibility for all aspects of type approval.

Proposal to amend para. 3.5.1. in Annex 3 to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the Type Approval Authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with requirements for software and hardware employed in the system to manage safety and continued compliance throughout the product lifecycle. This amendment resolves outstanding issues in the 01 series of amendments to UN Regulation No. 171.

Proposal to amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.1. to require that the strategy chosen shall not prejudice safe operation of the system due to failures with other systems involved in achieving the function of the system, and amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.4. to require that analysis of system behaviour on fault occurrence includes faults with other systems involved in achieving the function of the system, and to correct ‘safetys’ to ‘safety’. The proposal addresses a collision where tyre failure resulted in unsafe ABS activation. Although the 02 series clarified ABS as part of electronic control systems assessment, it does not explicitly state what is covered, potentially missing relevant faults or failures influencing system function. The additions ensure all relevant faults or failures are accounted for in manufacturers’ safety concept and analysis.

Proposal for guidance on operational states, including remote termination and a diagram illustrating ADS and feature operational states, update guidance on terms “on”, “off”, “available,” “active,” “unavailable,” and “disabled” as canonical operational state terms for ADS descriptions and clarify that “active” applies only to features.

Proposal to replace text explaining that the ADS IWG did not reach consensus on definitions with clarification that remote intervention and remote interaction were not intended to convey different meanings in the regulation, both covering cases where the ADS requires support for tactical functions while continuing to perform the entire dynamic driving task, note that this aspect of ADS is a developing area, and include references to SAE J3016-2021, EU 2022/1426, the Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium Best Practice for ADS Remote Assistance Use Case (Nov. 27, 2023), and the upcoming ISO/PAS 26361 standard.