Proposal to amend ADS-20-12 (consolidated guidance document). The terms faults, malfunctions, and abnormalities lack distinct meanings in requirement 6.1.4.2. The revised explanation clarifies that “faults, malfunctions, and abnormalities” do not have specific distinct meanings and cover any failure in the ADS’ capability to perform the DDT within the ODD. The three kinds of issues encompassed are warning signals from other systems, faults without warning signals a driver would perceive, and faults within the ADS itself.

Proposal to amend ADS-20-12 (consolidated guidance document). The ADS shall have strategies to detect and respond to instructions from road safety agents. For ADSF-1, this allows transfer of control to the fallback user. Manufacturers may use non-ADS strategies including remote intervention or permitting the road safety agent to drive. Examples of instructions include pull over, give way, stop after collision, move out of way, avoid specific road, and not overtake. Instructions may be issued via lights, sirens, audio messages, written signs, or light bar messages.

Proposal to amend Paragraph 5.3.1.3 (GTR) / 7.3.1.3 (UNR) in Safety Case. The revision replaces “no new behaviours or traffic flows” with “no new behaviours or traffic flows density or dynamic element types” and adds “or traffic behaviour” to the text regarding traffic laws because ODD does not include a definition of traffic behaviour, making the original sentence factually incorrect.

Proposal to amend para. 6.2.2.3.8.1 (b) to change “a driving task relevant area” to “the driving task relevant area” and to expand the accompanying GID text to define the driving task relevant area as consisting of different zones including inside mirror, left outside mirror, right outside mirror, left window, right window, windscreen, and instrument cluster or instrument display, and to clarify that depending on the type of ADS feature and driving situation the user could be suitable to have looked at just one zone or more than one zone.

Proposal to amend explanation of para. 6.2.2.1.4. to clarify that ‘while’ refers to continuous presentation of information sufficient to enable a user to take over performance of the DDT such as through ambient lighting, tell-tales, or dashboard colour changes. The explanation notes that information on adapted performance is only presented if applicable.

Proposal to revise the guidance on para. 6.1.2.3 of the draft UN Regulation on ADS regarding unreasonable disruption to traffic. The revision changes “prevent normal interaction” to “allow normal interaction” and “require other road users” to “may technically require other road users” to clarify that the requirement permits normal interaction with traffic, such as using on ramps, slowing for traffic lights, and waiting at unprotected turns, where other road users must adapt their speed, without violating the requirement.

Proposal for guidance on operational states, including remote termination and a diagram illustrating ADS and feature operational states, update guidance on terms “on”, “off”, “available,” “active,” “unavailable,” and “disabled” as canonical operational state terms for ADS descriptions and clarify that “active” applies only to features.

Proposal to replace text explaining that the ADS IWG did not reach consensus on definitions with clarification that remote intervention and remote interaction were not intended to convey different meanings in the regulation, both covering cases where the ADS requires support for tactical functions while continuing to perform the entire dynamic driving task, note that this aspect of ADS is a developing area, and include references to SAE J3016-2021, EU 2022/1426, the Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium Best Practice for ADS Remote Assistance Use Case (Nov. 27, 2023), and the upcoming ISO/PAS 26361 standard.

Proposal to add a new section on Cross-Cutting Organisational and Assurance Risks to AI-07-06. Six risks are proposed: insufficient organisational governance for AI safety management; inadequate definition of roles, responsibilities, and competencies; lack of independence between development and verification activities; degradation of AI safety processes over time; ineffective change management for AI-related artefacts and processes; and inadequate management of AI supply-chain risks. Each risk addresses factors across the lifecycle that can influence the effectiveness of technical AI risk mitigations.

Proposal concerning “detected objects” and data element precision for the ADS regulation provisions on DSSAD.

Proposal concerning “detected objects” and data element precision.

Systems with ACSF B2, D and E functionality cannot be approved to UN R79 unless incorporated within a DCAS complying with UN R171. However, these functionalities may exist independently of DCAS, requiring clear distinction. Where not part of DCAS, this must be specified in the EDR regulation. A new EDR data element, “DCAS status”, could encompass ACSF B2, D and E functionalities. These functionalities are now treated either as individual functions or as components of DCAS.

The proposal revises UN R10 paragraphs 3.1.8, 6.10.7 to clarify that intentional emissions from approved RF transmitters are excluded from emission limits when installed per manufacturer instructions without modification. New paragraph 3.1.9 requires risk assessment documentation for radio equipment installations.

The 7th Edition of IEC CISPR 12 was issued in June 2025, with work commencing on an 8th Edition. Two Special Task Forces are developing updates: one investigating dynamic testing at alternative fixed speeds and acceleration/deceleration modes, and another developing a measurement method for the frequency range 1 GHz to 6 GHz. An 8th Edition CISPR 12 is estimated for issue May–July 2028. For IEC CISPR 36, a Special Task Force concluded that conducted voltage emission measurements are more appropriate than magnetic radiated methods for charging mode testing. A 2nd Edition incorporating conducted voltage charging mode measurements is estimated for issue September–November 2027.

Responses to EPPR questionnaire on legislative gaps in the transposition of the GTR 2 into UN R40.

UN R13 and UN R78 establish different brake system requirements for 4-wheel vehicles. R13H requires split service brake systems with front/rear proportioning; R78 permits split service brake systems, combined brake systems, or two separate service brake systems without proportioning requirements. Type-O dry braking tests differ: R13H requires engine disconnected at 100 km/h with stopping distance 0.1v + 0.0060 v² and MFDD 6.43 m/s²; R78 specifies multiple tests at 40, 60, and 100 km/h with varying requirements. Type-I brake fade tests use different snub protocols and performance thresholds. Secondary braking failure criteria differ at specified speeds. R78 requires wet brake testing, a 30 km/h dynamic park brake test with 18% gradient and 5 minutes hold time; R13H specifies static gradient tests. R78 includes detailed ABS, functional safety, and regenerative braking requirements; R13H does not.

The document addresses consistency issues across multiple UN Regulations (R26, R28, R29, R34, R35, R39, R43, R45, R46, R48, R49, R134, R135, R137, R138, R141, R142, R143, R144) concerning automated driving systems. It proposes improved wording for fuel leakage provisions, foot control applicability for vehicles of category M₁, and speedometer requirements when ADS features are active. The document recommends removing duplicate definitions of ADS, DDT, bi-directional vehicle, and forward direction across regulations. It raises questions regarding application to category Y vehicles, handling of bi-directional traffic equipped vehicles, and whether requirements should apply to vehicle users or only when ADS features are active.

The Task Force on Substitutes/Retrofits reports progress on LED substitutes and retrofits. Actions completed include Step 1 on LED Substitutes and Step 2 on LED Replacements covering administrative and technical items. The Front Fog cluster H8, H16, HB4 was approved by WP29 in March 2026 and entered into force. Current focus is the High Beam cluster HB3, HIR2, H9 and H10, with technical discussions ongoing in GTB WGLS and H10 LEDr draft category sheet submitted. Market surveillance requires improvement across control points from manufacturer to road-side enforcement.

Category H10 sheet defines LED light source H10_LEDr dimensions, electrical and photometric characteristics, and measurement requirements. The LED light source shall not exceed the envelope indicated in Figure 2 and shall function in either voltage polarity. Essential characteristics include rated 12 volts, 21 watts, luminous flux 850 lm ± 15%, cap temperature maximum 100°C, and electrical current 1500 mA minimum at 12–14 V DC. The document specifies screen projection requirements using box systems, contrast requirements, and normalized luminous intensity distribution measurements in C-planes per CIE Publication 70-1987.

Provides corrections and updates to the requirements, including to reflect the fact that requirements for manipulation devices and manipulation strategies

Proposal to remove the provisions relating to manipulation devices and manipulation strategies that are being moved to UN R154 and clarify that in-service conformity checks for electric range of pure electric vehicles at low temperatures are optional.

Proposal to introduce provisions relating to

• Manipulation Devices and Strategies that were previously in the 09 series of amendments to UN R83,
• the levels to which certain provisions apply,
• clarifications and corrections to the requirements for the laboratory test for pure electric range ratio at low temperature for Pure Electric Vehicles
• an update to allow the use in Levels 1A and 2 of actual tyre rolling resistance values to calculate the final road load coefficient for the individual vehicles, and
• align the Regulation with the current regional status and the current state-of-the-art.

Proposal to amend UN R158 to include category O vehicles (trailers) within the scope of regulations for devices enabling driver awareness of vulnerable road users during reversing. The amendment aims to reduce safety risks to vulnerable road users when category O vehicles reverse. Amendments modify title, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 12.3, 12.4, and Annex 4, and introduce transitional provisions starting from September 2028. Justification includes casualty data showing seven fatalities and 15 serious injuries over 10 years from vehicles towing trailers reversing into vulnerable road users, plus a coroner’s recommendation for reversing cameras on all vehicles.

Proposal from the GRSG task force on Automated Vehicles Regulation Screening to enable the application of UN R122 to ADS vehicles and to ensure that the requirements minimise the risk of burns across all vehicle occupants.

Proposal from the ADAS task force to extend the provisions clarifying the scope between this Regulation and UN R171 for the ACSF categories B1, B2, C, D, E to ACSF category A.

Proposal to revise the transitional provisions and provisions on continued compliance with Safety Management Systems provisions.

Proposal to amend UN R155 and UN R156 regarding approval authority requirements:

• Add a refusal ground to para. 5.1.3. of UN R155 where the Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System has not been issued by the same approval authority granting type approval
• Insert new para. 5.4. into UN R156 to provide that approval authorities shall not grant any type approval if the Certificate of Compliance for the Software Update Management System has not been issued by the same approval authority granting type approval.

Proposal to amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.1. to require the vehicle manufacturer to supplement its statement with an explanation of how the chosen strategy ensures system objectives do not prejudice safe operation of systems referred to and a description of the validation plan, and to require the designated technical service to perform an assessment of the manufacturer’s explanation and validation plan suitability and may perform or require tests as specified in para. 4., and amend Annex 8, para. 3.4.4. to require documentation supported by analysis showing system behaviour on fault occurrence including faults with other systems involved in achieving system function, to establish and maintain analytical approaches open for inspection by the designated technical service at type approval, and to require the designated technical service to perform assessment including inspection of safety approach at concept and system levels and validation plans and results.

Proposal to amend GRVA/2026/13 and the 00 and 01 series of amendments of UN Regulation No. 157, modify the Introduction to remove reference to 60 km/h maximum speed and change “override” to “deactivate”, amend para. 5.1.1. to clarify that the activated system shall be free of unreasonable risks for both vehicle occupants and other road users and shall not cause reasonably foreseeable and preventable collisions, amend para. 10.1.1. to remove reference to foot controls, amend Annex 4 para. 3.5.4. to require manufacturers to report critical incidents to the Type Approval Authority, insert new Annex 4 para. 3.5.4.1. requiring the Type Approval Authority to upload information to DETA within 14 days of receipt, and insert new Annex 7 providing guidance for data exchange via DETA in accordance with para. 3.5.4.1. of Annex 4.

In January 2022, an M₁ passenger vehicle with a detached tyre caused its Anti-lock Braking System to activate, preventing effective braking and resulting in collision with a stationary lorry. The coroner concluded the ABS functioned as intended but created an unsafe scenario by using the fastest rotating wheel as reference speed, and recommended changes to prevent future deaths. The UK proposal to amend UN R13-H would require manufacturers to affirm that strategies to achieve system objectives will not prejudice safe operation of systems under non-fault conditions, including failures of other systems involved in achieving system function such as tyres or wheels, and that documentation be supported by analysis showing how the system will behave upon any fault with bearing on vehicle control, performance, or safety, including faults with other systems involved in achieving system function.

Proposal to amend para. 3.5.1. of Annex 4 to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the approval authority that effective processes, methodologies and tools are in place, up to date and being followed within the organization to manage the safety and continued compliance throughout the product lifecycle, and to demonstrate to the approval authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with these requirements.

Proposal to delete the draft “Reserved” paragraph 5.3.7.2.4.3. in GRVA/2026/18. Reserving paragraph 5.3.7.2.4.3. in the 01 series would mean that the subsequent paragraphs would be out of line with the numbering in the 02 series, making future amendments to UN R171 unnecessarily challenging.

Proposal to amend the original version (GRVA/2026/15), insert para. 5.3.7.2.1.13. to require the manufacturer to describe in the safety concept the system behaviour in case the driver is detected to be disengaged during a manoeuvre; amend the original version and the 01 series (GRVA/2026/15 and GRVA/2026/17), amend para. 3.5.1. of Annex 3 to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the Type Approval Authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with requirements; amend the 01 and 02 series (GRVA/2026/17 and WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 2.3.2. of Appendix 2 of Annex 3; amend the 02 series (WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 4.2.5.2.19.2.1. of Annex 4; and amend the original version, 01 series and 02 series (GRVA/2026/15, GRVA/2026/17 and WP.29/2026/86), amend para. 4.2.5.2.14.1.2. of Annex 4 and para. 4.2.5.2.14.2.1. of Annex 4.

Proposal to amend para. 3.4.1. and 3.4.4. of Annex 8 to require manufacturers to account for faults or failures with other systems involved in achieving the function of the braking system in their safety concept and analysis, and insert new para. 4.5. in Annex 6 requiring consideration of implausible wheel-speed information effects on anti-lock system operation in fault analysis. The proposal responds to a fatal collision in the United Kingdom where tyre failure and inaccurate wheel speed signals caused ABS activation that resulted in loss of braking force.

Proposal to amend para. 5.1.3., insert new paras. 5.1.5. and 5.1.5.1. requiring the Approval Authority to refuse type approval unless the Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System is issued by the same Approval Authority granting vehicle type approval, while permitting referencing of certificates from other Approval Authorities under specific conditions with documented agreements and clarified responsibilities, and insert new paras. 5.4. and 5.4.1. with equivalent requirements for the Software Update Management System Certificate of Compliance.

Proposal to amend paragraph AI to introduce a link between existing text in Part A and new text in Part C regarding vehicle transformations, and insert new Part C providing guidance for the application of UN Regulation No. 155 to transformed vehicles. The proposal adds section 6 clarifying that the requirement for the Certificate of Compliance and type approval to be issued by the same Approval Authority applies only within the scope of the type approval granted to the manufacturer concerned, and does not restrict another manufacturer from obtaining a separate type approval and associated Certificate of Compliance from the responsible Approval Authority.

Proposal to amend explanatory text for UNR paragraph 3.2.3. (b) to clarify that the manufacturer should explain how they determine and apply the concept of the safety level of the ADS being at least to the level of a competent and careful human driver, accounting for national specificities, and that there may be different approaches used in applying this concept, including reference driver based approaches and behaviour-based approaches.

Proposal based on informal document GRVA-25-43 to amend Annex 4, para. 3.5.1. to require the manufacturer to demonstrate to the Type Approval Authority at least every three years that the safety management system continues to comply with requirements for software and hardware employed in the system. This amendment applies the same principle regarding Safety Management System compliance as specified in UN Regulation No. 171 on Driver Control Assistance Systems.

Proposal to amend UN R155 by inserting new para. 5.1.3.(e) establishing that the Certificate of Compliance for the Cyber Security Management System shall not be issued by a different Approval Authority than the one granting type approval, and amend UN R156 by inserting new para. 5.4. establishing that Approval Authorities shall not grant type approval if the Certificate of Compliance for the Software Update Management System has not been issued by the same Approval Authority granting type approval. Justification includes ensuring holistic cybersecurity assessment, clarifying reporting obligations under para. 7.2.2.2.(g), addressing unharmonized mutual recognition of management system certificates, maintaining consistency between regulations, and upholding the fundamental principle that approval authorities retain responsibility for all aspects of type approval.