| ADS-12: Logistical information for Tokyo session |
| Reference Number: AI-12-00-Rev.1 |
|
AI IWG 12th session will be held October 26–27, 2026, at the Zennihon Truck Sogo Kaikan, 3rd Floor, Tokyo. October 26 runs 10:00–17:30 with reception at 18:30; October 27 runs 09:30–17:00. The meeting room opens 9:30 a.m. October 26 and 9:00 a.m. October 27. In-person attendance is limited to the first 50 registrants. Participants must complete the survey by September 25. JASIC staff contact information and accommodation recommendations are provided. |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 31 Aug 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Clarify uncertainty-related risk propagation across AI modules |
| Reference Number: AI-12-03-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add text to para. 3.2.4.6 clarifying that uncertainty-related risks may propagate from upstream to downstream AI modules when uncertainty information is inadequately communicated or used, affecting the resulting action, and to add text to Annex 2, item 1.6 clarifying that inadequate communication or use of uncertainty information across AI modules can propagate or amplify uncertainty-related risks and affect the resulting action, even when the upstream estimate is informative. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 07 Nov 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Clarify uncertainty-related risk propagation across AI modules |
| Reference Number: AI-12-04-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add text to para. 3.2.4.6 clarifying that uncertainty-related risks may propagate from upstream to downstream AI modules when uncertainty information is inadequately communicated or used, affecting the resulting action, and to add text to Annex 2, item 1.6 clarifying that inadequate communication or use of uncertainty information across AI modules can propagate or amplify uncertainty-related risks and affect the resulting action, even when the upstream estimate is informative. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Extend existing uncertainty practices while preserving the Annex 3 structure |
| Reference Number: AI-12-05-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to append sentences to paragraph 2 addressing uncertainty-related risks propagated from upstream to downstream AI modules and supporting uncertainty-aware action, and to paragraph 3 considering whether uncertainty information remains meaningful when used by downstream AI modules and how it affects the resulting action. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Add concise working terms for uncertainty |
| Reference Number: AI-12-06-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add working definitions for uncertainty quantification, aleatoric uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty, and uncertainty-aware action at the end of section 1.3 of AI-11-03, Annex 5. These definitions do not replace definitions in applicable standards and support general discussion of uncertainty and its effects on action. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Clarify the scope of cybersecurity-related AI uses |
| Reference Number: AI-12-07-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to modify Annex 1, 1.1.2 to replace the clause beginning ‘and such applications fall within the scope’ with language clarifying that applications fall within the first mode of AI use only where AI is part of the regulated product and directly performs or supports a safety-relevant function, and to add that AI tools used solely for development or assessment fall under section 2.3.3. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Clarify data terminology, conceptual boundaries and definitions |
| Reference Number: AI-12-08-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to modify the definition of Validation Data to replace ‘a final’ with ‘candidate’ and append clarification that it is used for model selection or tuning while independent test data used for final performance reporting are not used for model selection or tuning, and add a definition of Test Data as data used to evaluate the final selected model and not used for fitting, model selection or tuning, with a note on dataset separation to avoid leakage between sets. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Clarify data terminology, conceptual boundaries and definitions |
| Reference Number: AI-12-09-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to modify the definition of concept drift in para. 3.2.9.2 and Annex 2, para. 6.2 to clarify that concept drift arises when changes alter the relationship between inputs and target outputs, and that a change in input distribution alone does not necessarily imply a change in this relationship. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Clarify data terminology, conceptual boundaries and definitions |
| Reference Number: AI-12-10-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to insert a sentence in para. 2.2.1 clarifying that decision trees can be learned from data and not all are manually specified rule systems, and to modify para. 2.2.5 to state that Generative AI models can use different architectures, with some being Transformer-based and potentially foundation or general-purpose AI models. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Add principles and stages of risk-driven lifecycle approach |
| Reference Number: AI-12-11-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add principles and stages of risk-driven lifecycle approach to para. 4.2.1.1, replacing ‘risk informed lifecycle approaches explanation’ with ‘Risk-driven lifecycle approach explanation’ and adding explicit reference to principles of risk-driven lifecycle approach and stages of risk-driven lifecycle approach. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Safety requirements for AI/models should be derived from vehicle and system architecture decomposition |
| Reference Number: AI-12-12-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to conduct safety analysis based on vehicle and system architecture to identify and decompose data and model-related safety requirements, and delete the requirement for maintenance or reassessment of assumptions as the system or environment changes. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Modify requirement for management of changes in data and operational distributions |
| Reference Number: AI-12-13-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to modify para. 4.2.5.2 to replace ‘management of changes in data and operational distributions’ with ‘management of changes in data and process assurance’. Where a closed-loop data chain is applied to vehicle AI systems safety development activities, evidence of safety assurance capability of the complete closed-loop data chain shall be provided, including safety assurance descriptions for data collection, data processing, and data annotation processes. Where data training is used as an improvement measure for functional insufficiency, relevant analysis shall be conducted and the rationality of the data shall be justified to ensure the improved system meets system-level safety-related requirements. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Clarifying the scope of the "AI Safety" definition in Annex 5 through a single NB note |
| Reference Number: AI-12-14-Rev.1 |
|
Add one NB note beneath the “AI Safety” definition in Annex 5, Section 1.1, item 4, clarifying that the definition uses “safety” in the functional-safety sense and that hazards affecting AI-based safety functions may be initiated by malicious actions or arise from personal data processing, and that assurance of AI systems interacts with cybersecurity and data-privacy requirements such as UN R155 and ISO/SAE 21434. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Clarification of Boundaries and Dependencies between AI Use Modes |
| Reference Number: AI-12-15-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to insert new sections 2.3.7 and 2.3.8 to clarify the classification criteria and boundaries of the three modes of AI use and provide representative examples illustrating their practical application, establishing that classification should be based on the role and purpose of AI in specific activities rather than assigning a fixed mode to a particular model or process, and that the same AI-related model, system, artefact or process may correspond to different modes at different stages or when used for different purposes. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Addition of risk-proportionality introductory paragraph at start of Section 4.2 |
| Reference Number: AI-12-16-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to insert an introductory paragraph before para. 4.2.1 to establish that the depth and rigor of applying common AI risk management concepts should be commensurate with the safety risk level of the specific AI application, with risk levels informed by ISO 26262 ASIL classification and ISO 21448 SOTIF risk assessment, as well as the degree of AI system autonomy and adaptability, and to elevate the proportionality principle from a sub-point within para. 4.2.1.1 to a framing principle for the entire Section 4.2. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Addition of new common concept: Human oversight and system controllability (Section 4.2.10) |
| Reference Number: AI-12-17-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to insert new section 4.2.10 defining human oversight and system controllability as complementary dimensions addressing the human-machine interaction layer and engineering design layer. The concept establishes that human oversight refers to the ability of natural persons to monitor, understand, intervene in, and override AI system outputs affecting safety, while system controllability refers to the ability of external agents to influence AI system behavior to prevent harm. For driving automation functions, human oversight and fallback vary with automation level as defined in SAE J3016 / ISO/SAE 22736. For non-driving safety functions, controllability may be achieved through audible or visual warnings, output degradation, or fail-safe behavior. System-level controllability measures include dedicated safety monitors, redundant model architectures, and structured fallback or fail-safe degradation strategies. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Introduce data-related safety properties as the common practice thread for data-group risks 4.1–4.5 and concept 4.2.5 |
| Reference Number: AI-12-18-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to introduce the nine data-related safety properties defined in ISO/PAS 8800:2024 (Accuracy, Completeness, Correctness, Independence of datasets, Integrity, Representativeness, Temporality, Traceability and Verifiability) as a common verification thread across rows 4.1–4.5 in Annex 3 and Section 4.2.5, add an anchoring practice for row 4.4 (Distribution Shift) requiring periodic monitoring and reassessment of data–model drift with re-evaluation of the safety argument where drift is detected, and list digital watermarking and AI-based automated audit as candidate illustrative practices. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Add risk item: Compromised or Unavailable Cooperative Inputs (new 3.2.9.5) |
| Reference Number: AI-12-19-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add a new risk item addressing compromised or unavailable infrastructure-sourced inputs in para. 3.2.9.5, add a corresponding extended description in Annex 2 (item 6.5), add a new table row in Annex 3, and add the term ‘Roadside Perception’ to Annex 5. AI systems that rely on roadside perception, map data, or remotely-delivered data may encounter communication outages, latency, or maliciously-altered incoming data, resulting in perception gaps or erroneous decisions. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Reference ISO 3450x scenario framework and add to literature list |
| Reference Number: AI-12-20-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add to illustrative practices in para. 4.2.6.3 a reference to scenario coverage assessment based on ISO 34502 and test case generation based on ISO 34505 as sources of evidence for AI system assurance, and to add ISO 34501-34505 to Annex 4 A standards list. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Add AI-specific use cases to Annex 1 |
| Reference Number: AI-12-21-Rev.1 |
|
Proposal to add illustrative real-world application examples under Automated Driving Systems in Annex 1, items 1.2.4 and 1.3, covering low-speed unmanned delivery and sanitation vehicles in closed or semi-open areas and urban non-motorized lanes, robotaxi operation on urban roads, and autonomously-operated vehicles deployed within mining sites, ports and industrial parks. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: ACPE technical term incomplete |
| Reference Number: AI-12-22-Rev.1 |
|
Change request to revise the driving function name from ‘Acceleration Control Pedal Error’ to ‘Acceleration Control for Pedal Error’ in Section 1.2.4, based on UNECE guidance that the original term is not a correct driving function name. |
| Submitted by: China |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| AI Management System: Bridging the Gap Between AI and Current Open Norms |
| Reference Number: AI-12-23 |
|
Presentation proposing an AI Management System (AIMS) as a complementary organizational layer to existing safety, cybersecurity, and software update management systems. AIMS would regulate AI through organizational processes rather than technical requirements, covering data lifecycle, model development, verification and validation, change control, and operational monitoring. The system is technology-neutral, lifecycle-based, and aligned with industry standards including ISO 26262, ISO 21448, and ISO/IEC 42001, avoiding the need for product-specific AI test procedures and re-approval of model updates. |
| Submitted by: Netherlands |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 22 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: UN Regulation No. 155 | Cyber Security and Cyber Security Management, UN Regulation No. 156 | Software Update Processes and Management Systems, WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence, and UN Regulation No. 185 | Approval of vehicles with regard to their Automated Driving Systems |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: Comments on AI-11-03 |
| Reference Number: AI-12-24 |
|
Comments on the structure and content of the draft reference document on artificial intelligence in regulated automotive safety systems. Notes a six-month timeline for adoption by WP.29 in June 2027, with formal submissions due by March 2027. Recommends prioritizing a future-proof repository of information on potential AI-related risks and risk management that can be maintained through standard WP.29 processes. States current regulatory frameworks are sufficient to address unreasonable safety risks from AI use in vehicles. Suggests the document should include introductory explanatory text for non-specialists, clear definitions of technical terms, accessible risk summaries, and a developed risk-management section to support WP.29 regulatory activities. |
| Submitted by: AAPC |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 23 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Road-Scene Image Generation for Safety Evaluation of Automated Driving Systems |
| Reference Number: AI-12-25 |
|
Study on image generation method to support evaluation of automated driving systems. Fine-tuned an image generator on the Zenseact Open Dataset using 100,000 road-scene images annotated with 3D bounding boxes. Demonstrated ability to generate plausible images reflecting scenario specifications and to create images causing detection errors in object detectors. Next steps include quantitatively evaluating validity and realism of generated images and developing methods to automatically identify scenario specifications that degrade object detector performance. |
| Submitted by: Japan |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 25 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Regulatory Project | Automated Driving Systems and WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| AI informal group updated work schedule |
| Reference Number: AI-12-26-Rev.1 |
| Submitted by: AI |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 27 Oct 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
| Artificial Intelligence: General comments for drafting approach for the Baseline Document |
| Reference Number: AI-12-27-Rev.1 |
|
General guidance for drafting the baseline document on artificial intelligence in the automotive sector. The document emphasizes focusing revision on green text in AI-11-03, using change requests for substantive modifications processed during IWG plenary sessions, and integrating successful requests into a single master document. Four sections are addressed: Introduction (AAPC lead) to clarify purpose and scope; AI Uses & Benefits (OICA/CLEPA lead) to provide intuitive understanding and define terms; Risks (modifications by change request); and Risk Management (China and EME leads) to clarify operationalization in certification regimes while maintaining agreement-neutral, conceptual language at reference document level, avoiding prescriptive guidance. |
| Submitted by: AI |
| Meeting Sessions: 12th AI session (26-27 Oct) |
| Document date: 04 Nov 26 |
| Relevant to: WP.29 Discussion Topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| Click here to view the full document file |
No matching documents.