Informal Group on Accident Emergency Call Systems | Session 2 | 5-6 Dec 2013
Paris
Agenda Item 7.2.

The Secretary introduced this subject and indicated that when the AECS emits its call, the communication is established after some connecting protocols are fulfilled (synchronization of the signals between the AECS and the mobile telephone communication network). The question is whether the AECS is compliant when the AECS emits its call, when the signals of the AECS and the network are synchronized (i.e. communication with the mobile phone network), or even later when the 2-way voice communication is established with the Public Safety Answering Point (i.e. communication with the PSAP). In the second case, the mobile phone network must be simulated in the approval test, in the third case, the mobile phone network AND the PSAP must be simulated.

OICA recalled the 3 part structure of the regulation and was of the opinion that a separate device should be approved to Part I up to the MSD emission. Part II (vehicle equipped with approved device) would be for assessing that the system is connected to the net. The expert stressed that there would be no need for further test as this would be double testing. For the Part III, the expert said that the discussion should be taken separate.

Russia generally agreed to avoid double certification. Yet Part III requirements should include all those included in Part I assuming AECS did not pass Part I certification. The delegate stressed that regardless AECD or AECS approach there is a need to check that AECD/AECS (including antenna and audio system) surviving the crash.

OICA recalled that most crash facilities are in the basement, and many Type Approvals will be conducted out of EU or Russia, i.e. tests with complete vehicles may not have a net coverage, hence the need to distinguish the network from the rest.

Russia stated that simulation of network and mobile phone network does exist today.

The group acknowledged the concern regarding the cost of such network simulation devices and their availability. Russia has given an example of Rohde-Schwarz CMW500 eCall tester. OICA clarified that the manufacturers cannot guarantee the network functioning and availability, and that the vehicle could only be tested for what is on-board, i.e. the regulation should be limited to the equipment mounted in the vehicle.

Concerning the voice communication, the informal group was informed that the current systems are not guaranteed to survive a crash. The manufacturers would like to avoid having to develop and install an additional audio system separate to the existing one.

Russia stated that the system is designed to report the crash and it is therefore important to demonstrate that the system is still operational after the crash. The expert from Russia found the voice part a vital component of the emergency response service and that it needs to remain operational after the crash in addition to data transmission capability.

The German Technical Service questioned why to perform the crash test: they proposed that the regulation should either assess that AECS survives all the crashes, or verify that a triggering signal is emitted. The expert from Germany suggested a sled test for assessing e.g. the audio system post-crash survival (e.g. 20 G pulse). OICA stressed that the regulatory tests only simulate the reality, and hence verify e.g. the antenna only in certain particular conditions. Hence the most representative test is the pulse, and the verification that the antenna remains attached.

Russia acknowledged that test can only cover simulation, yet was keen that the system survives the crash in order to be efficient. RUS reminded an earlier conclusion that UN R94/95 environment is the best practical approximation and should be relied upon.

OICA pointed out that the 1st important item should be the triggering signal, then the survival of the system, then the MSD, then phone communication and then PSAP answering capacities.

The expert from Russia:

  • Suggested to find a way to test crash survival
  • Agreed to use UN R94/95 as an environment for the test
  • suggested a pass/fail criterion for AECS survival in a crash
  • was keen that the emission of data be tested with or without mobile phone network available

OICA committed to prepare a proposal along these lines for the next meeting. In addition, the basic requirement is that the PSAP receives a signal to which it can react should be integrated into the draft regulation. The EU and Russia found 2-way voice communication as a minimal requirement.

Conclusion:

  • Agreement to avoid double testing in the regulation
    • o approval of a vehicle equipped with approved AECD (Part II): all that was already approved on AECD shall not have to be re-assessed
  • Provisions to cover AECS post-crash functioning (pass/fail criteria to be developed)
  • Post-crash AECS capabilities to cover at least data emission after UN R94/95 crash environment
  • OICA to provide approach to testing AECS capabilities for transmission of data after UN R94/95 environment, alternative to testing end2end transmission, for next meeting
  • OICA to provide proposal for post-crash 2-way voice communication in the UN R94/95 environment for next meeting.