Proposal to add a foonote to ensure a review of AEBS target speeds by 2021 in the expectation that experience and technological improvements will provide data and justification for lowering target speeds and enhancing safety.

The Chair informed that whatever the outcome of the discussions about the warning time, the group could decide on a 2-step approach.

NL was of the opinion that, only if the informal group manages to find the criteria for the row 2, then there is a need to define the 2nd step with values.

D preferred to follow the natural process of amending the regulation.

J found the 2nd step a future work because the experts are lacking data and experience.

There is a need for the manufacturers to get experience in the field.

CLEPA pointed out the difficulty for the group to define the 1st step right now, and recommended to follow the natural approach.

NL could accept this opinion but stressed that the proposed values for the 1st step, if adopted, are a rather easy target.

F suggested adding a footnote with a commitment to find values for the 2nd step.

The Chair urged France to produce a written proposal in the course of the 19th meeting.

OICA and CLEPA found the idea of a commitment not realistic because the 1st step would be implemented in 2018 (registration date), i.e. leading GRRF to commit for 2020.

The group reviewed the proposal from France for a footnote (document AEBS/LDWS-19-06). Some debate took place about the wording of the footnote:

  – The date of 1 November is unclear as it could be interpreted as the time as from which the vehicles must be equipped with AEBS complying with the new values, or the time as from which the informal group will be revived
  – The wording “review” can mean the study of the data or the decision about new values.

Industry was keen that 3 years be given to design the vehicles in accordance with the new values.

NL found appropriate to have such a footnote for guaranteeing the revision of the values in the future.

D, J and ROK could support the wording as revised by the group.

J and NL presented their respective documents (AEBS/LDWS-19-03 and AEBS/LDWS-19-04).

OICA questioned the value of 45km/h mentioned in the second bullet of the NL document justifications. NL clarified that the value of 1,2 seconds referred to in the document addresses the TTC, which varies as long as the vehicle decelerates.

F was of the opinion that the warning time exists to permit the driver to react, hence must be adapted to the driver’s reaction time. In addition, the expert from F wondered why the reaction time is different for the light and the heavy vehicles, while the drivers are all human.

OICA pointed the equal importance of nuisance of too early warnings and the driver’s reaction. The system would become counterproductive should early warnings be too frequent. A too early warning in addition would be design restrictive.

Mr. Clasen referred to the document WP29/1091/Add.1, paragraphs 64-66, which urges the designers to avoid too early warnings.

J acknowledged this document and recalled the row 1 performance requirement (warning time). The delegate from J stressed that the current discussion addresses Row 2 vehicles, and J believed that the J proposal for 0.8s is acceptable in terms of nuisance.

Mr. Clasen recalled that the light vehicles are more agile, hence the driver’s reaction by avoidance via steering can occure later, and recalled the existence of the build-up time on hydraulic braking vehicles.

The Chair recalled that NL requested at the previous meeting some figures about the pressure build-up time for hydraulic braking systems.

CLEPA answered that the Industry experience of build-up time for these vehicles and systems is rather inexistent, the reference value would address ESP, and this would apply to 2 wheels only. The expert from CLEPA informed that a value between 0.8 and 1.5 seconds can be reasonable.

The Chair pointed out that the consequence of such pressure build up time would be that there would be not a full braking during the emergency braking phase.

Mr. Clasen informed that the temperature influences the pressure build-up time due to the transmission oil viscosity and the brake disks friction coefficient.

As a summary, the Chair pointed out that 3 Contracting Parties (J, NL and F) are asking to specify a value for the advanced warning timing, and that D had already indicated their support for the joint OICA/CLEPA proposal at the previous meeting. ROK took no position on this issue.

The Chair suggested, in an attempt to make progress, to separate in the discussions for the stationary target the cells B2 (early warning) and C2 (late warning)) and to do the same afterwards for the moving target.

In response, industry presented their proposal for flexibility for the moving target scenario (document AEBS/LDWS-19-05), indicating that they could accept a 0.8 sec value for the 1st warning provided this could done by optical means.

Moving target scenario

The Chair then suggested to discuss first the moving target scenario.

J could not accept the Industry proposal because they considered braking more important than the warning annoyance. J confirmed their support of the NL proposal.

For the moving target scenario in the Industry position, J could not accept “Optical only”.

NL could not accept optical only for the 1st warning. In the case of the moving target scenario the expert was of the opinion that the nuisance is not that critical.

F pointed out that the distance between the target and the subject vehicle with 1s TTC in the moving target scenario is 4m and proposed the 1st warning at 1.4 s and asked Industry about the driver’s acceptance with that limit (same as in Row 1).

D could support the Industry proposal.

ROK had no opinion but welcomed the flexibility of Industry.

The Chair considered that the discussions indicated some possibility of compromise about the warning timing for the moving target scenario (except from France)

F repeated their support for “optical only” but wanted 1.4 s warning time delay, with 0.8 s for the 2nd warning signal.

Mr. Clasen pointed out that long warning time would jeopardise the manufacturer’s wish to increase the speed reduction because the total time would then not be acceptable. OICA added that such warning time would question the speed reduction, in addition to the security margin and the vehicle dynamics. Also, Industry pointed out the fact that the regulation provides only the minimum values and provides freedom to the manufacturer to do better. One manufacturer gave the example of one of his production line, where 10% of the production are N2, the others are N1. The warning time at 0.8s would permit to use the N1 category AEBS system on the N2 vehicles, while forbidding this would make the AEBS too expensive.

F pointed out the EuroNCAP draft protocol of 1.2 s for driver’s reaction and could agree with this value of 1.2s.

It was stressed that EuroNCAP only addresses the M1 vehicles and that the protocol is still under discussion.

The Chair cautioned that the lack of flexibility by one Contracting Party would entail the risk that the informal group has to turn to its parent body, i.e. GRRF, for seeking guidance or even resolution on this technical matter.

F confirmed its position, and repeated to agree with 1.2 s for the 1st warning.

The Chair concluded by regretting that the informal group could not find a compromise for the warning time for the moving target scenario and announced his intention to request guidance from GRRF.

The Chair suggested to discuss the “optical only” 1st warning based on the assumption that a compromise could be later found for the value of warning time.

F confirmed the willing of 1.2s for the 1st signal.

OICA stressed that there is currently no experience of the system on these vehicles, and the need to get millions of kms with different drivers before making a decision on a possible compromise, in view of the risk to completely jeopardise the market confidence in this system.

The Chair therefore suggested asking guidance to GRRF on this issue as well.

Stationary target scenario

The group then started discussions on the stationary target scenario. The Chair recalled his proposal for a compromise for B2 and C2 cells, i.e. separating the values for the 1st warning from those for the 2nd warning.

OICA recalled their offer for flexibility for moving target scenario, and could not be more flexible for the stationary target scenario. The expert recalled the distance of 40 m in front of the target in case of a 0.8s warning time, in particular in view that the system is currently purely theoretical. The proposal is to amend the text such that the warning time is given BEFORE the start of the emergency braking phase. OICA was cautious in accepting an “optical only” warning in this case in view of the fact that the Contracting Parties did not accept the “optical only” for the moving target scenario.

NL found that the parameter for the stationary target scenario is the sensor recognition of a stationary target. NL recalled that a TTC of 1.8 sec provides at least 30m between the subject vehicle and the target. NL could accept optical only.

D supported the Chair’s proposal.

J could support 0.8s for the timing, and could not accept “optical only”.

F could accept the Chair’s proposal.

ROK could also support the Chair’s proposal.

OICA could not accept the J position, and was willing to have a further Industry internal consultation about the Chair’s proposal.

Temporary conclusion: no conclusive decision on warning times. See also item 5.2. below.

Proposal from the expert of The Netherlands regarding the specifications of timing of warning modes, speed reduction and target speed for AEBS for vehicles of category M2 and N2 ≤ 8 t

J and NL presented their respective documents (AEBS/LDWS-19-03 and AEBS/LDWS-19-04).

OICA questioned the value of 45km/h mentioned in the second bullet of the NL document justifications. NL clarified that the value of 1,2 seconds referred to in the document addresses the TTC, which varies as long as the vehicle decelerates.

F was of the opinion that the warning time exists to permit the driver to react, hence must be adapted to the driver’s reaction time. In addition, the expert from F wondered why the reaction time is different for the light and the heavy vehicles, while the drivers are all human.

OICA pointed the equal importance of nuisance of too early warnings and the driver’s reaction. The system would become counterproductive should early warnings be too frequent. A too early warning in addition would be design restrictive.

Mr. Clasen referred to the document WP29/1091/Add.1, paragraphs 64-66, which urges the designers to avoid too early warnings.

J acknowledged this document and recalled the row 1 performance requirement (warning time). The delegate from J stressed that the current discussion addresses Row 2 vehicles, and J believed that the J proposal for 0.8s is acceptable in terms of nuisance.

Mr. Clasen recalled that the light vehicles are more agile, hence the driver’s reaction by avoidance via steering can occure later, and recalled the existence of the build-up time on hydraulic braking vehicles.

The Chair recalled that NL requested at the previous meeting some figures about the pressure build-up time for hydraulic braking systems.

CLEPA answered that the Industry experience of build-up time for these vehicles and systems is rather inexistent, the reference value would address ESP, and this would apply to 2 wheels only. The expert from CLEPA informed that a value between 0.8 and 1.5 seconds can be reasonable.

The Chair pointed out that the consequence of such pressure build up time would be that there would be not a full braking during the emergency braking phase.

Mr. Clasen informed that the temperature influences the pressure build-up time due to the transmission oil viscosity and the brake disks friction coefficient.

As a summary, the Chair pointed out that 3 Contracting Parties (J, NL and F) are asking to specify a value for the advanced warning timing, and that D had already indicated their support for the joint OICA/CLEPA proposal at the previous meeting. ROK took no position on this issue.

The Chair suggested, in an attempt to make progress, to separate in the discussions for the stationary target the cells B2 (early warning) and C2 (late warning)) and to do the same afterwards for the moving target.

In response, industry presented their proposal for flexibility for the moving target scenario (document AEBS/LDWS-19-05), indicating that they could accept a 0.8 sec value for the 1st warning provided this could done by optical means.

Moving target scenario

The Chair then suggested to discuss first the moving target scenario.

J could not accept the Industry proposal because they considered braking more important than the warning annoyance. J confirmed their support of the NL proposal.

For the moving target scenario in the Industry position, J could not accept “Optical only”.

NL could not accept optical only for the 1st warning. In the case of the moving target scenario the expert was of the opinion that the nuisance is not that critical.

F pointed out that the distance between the target and the subject vehicle with 1s TTC in the moving target scenario is 4m and proposed the 1st warning at 1.4 s and asked Industry about the driver’s acceptance with that limit (same as in Row 1).

D could support the Industry proposal.

ROK had no opinion but welcomed the flexibility of Industry.

The Chair considered that the discussions indicated some possibility of compromise about the warning timing for the moving target scenario (except from France)

F repeated their support for “optical only” but wanted 1.4 s warning time delay, with 0.8 s for the 2nd warning signal.

Mr. Clasen pointed out that long warning time would jeopardise the manufacturer’s wish to increase the speed reduction because the total time would then not be acceptable. OICA added that such warning time would question the speed reduction, in addition to the security margin and the vehicle dynamics. Also, Industry pointed out the fact that the regulation provides only the minimum values and provides freedom to the manufacturer to do better. One manufacturer gave the example of one of his production line, where 10% of the production are N2, the others are N1. The warning time at 0.8s would permit to use the N1 category AEBS system on the N2 vehicles, while forbidding this would make the AEBS too expensive.

F pointed out the EuroNCAP draft protocol of 1.2 s for driver’s reaction and could agree with this value of 1.2s.

It was stressed that EuroNCAP only addresses the M1 vehicles and that the protocol is still under discussion.

The Chair cautioned that the lack of flexibility by one Contracting Party would entail the risk that the informal group has to turn to its parent body, i.e. GRRF, for seeking guidance or even resolution on this technical matter.

F confirmed its position, and repeated to agree with 1.2 s for the 1st warning.

The Chair concluded by regretting that the informal group could not find a compromise for the warning time for the moving target scenario and announced his intention to request guidance from GRRF.

The Chair suggested to discuss the “optical only” 1st warning based on the assumption that a compromise could be later found for the value of warning time.

F confirmed the willing of 1.2s for the 1st signal.

OICA stressed that there is currently no experience of the system on these vehicles, and the need to get millions of kms with different drivers before making a decision on a possible compromise, in view of the risk to completely jeopardise the market confidence in this system.

The Chair therefore suggested asking guidance to GRRF on this issue as well.

Stationary target scenario

The group then started discussions on the stationary target scenario. The Chair recalled his proposal for a compromise for B2 and C2 cells, i.e. separating the values for the 1st warning from those for the 2nd warning.

OICA recalled their offer for flexibility for moving target scenario, and could not be more flexible for the stationary target scenario. The expert recalled the distance of 40 m in front of the target in case of a 0.8s warning time, in particular in view that the system is currently purely theoretical. The proposal is to amend the text such that the warning time is given BEFORE the start of the emergency braking phase. OICA was cautious in accepting an “optical only” warning in this case in view of the fact that the Contracting Parties did not accept the “optical only” for the moving target scenario.

NL found that the parameter for the stationary target scenario is the sensor recognition of a stationary target. NL recalled that a TTC of 1.8 sec provides at least 30m between the subject vehicle and the target. NL could accept optical only.

D supported the Chair’s proposal.

J could support 0.8s for the timing, and could not accept “optical only”.

F could accept the Chair’s proposal.

ROK could also support the Chair’s proposal.

OICA could not accept the J position, and was willing to have a further Industry internal consultation about the Chair’s proposal.

Temporary conclusion: no conclusive decision on warning times. See also item 5.2. below.

Submitted in annex to document AEBS/LDWS-19-02 concerning the need for appropriate warning signals in conjunction with AEBS.

J and NL presented their respective documents (AEBS/LDWS-19-03 and AEBS/LDWS-19-04).

OICA questioned the value of 45km/h mentioned in the second bullet of the NL document justifications. NL clarified that the value of 1,2 seconds referred to in the document addresses the TTC, which varies as long as the vehicle decelerates.

F was of the opinion that the warning time exists to permit the driver to react, hence must be adapted to the driver’s reaction time. In addition, the expert from F wondered why the reaction time is different for the light and the heavy vehicles, while the drivers are all human.

OICA pointed the equal importance of nuisance of too early warnings and the driver’s reaction. The system would become counterproductive should early warnings be too frequent. A too early warning in addition would be design restrictive.

Mr. Clasen referred to the document WP29/1091/Add.1, paragraphs 64-66, which urges the designers to avoid too early warnings.

J acknowledged this document and recalled the row 1 performance requirement (warning time). The delegate from J stressed that the current discussion addresses Row 2 vehicles, and J believed that the J proposal for 0.8s is acceptable in terms of nuisance.

Mr. Clasen recalled that the light vehicles are more agile, hence the driver’s reaction by avoidance via steering can occure later, and recalled the existence of the build-up time on hydraulic braking vehicles.

The Chair recalled that NL requested at the previous meeting some figures about the pressure build-up time for hydraulic braking systems.

CLEPA answered that the Industry experience of build-up time for these vehicles and systems is rather inexistent, the reference value would address ESP, and this would apply to 2 wheels only. The expert from CLEPA informed that a value between 0.8 and 1.5 seconds can be reasonable.

The Chair pointed out that the consequence of such pressure build up time would be that there would be not a full braking during the emergency braking phase.

Mr. Clasen informed that the temperature influences the pressure build-up time due to the transmission oil viscosity and the brake disks friction coefficient.

As a summary, the Chair pointed out that 3 Contracting Parties (J, NL and F) are asking to specify a value for the advanced warning timing, and that D had already indicated their support for the joint OICA/CLEPA proposal at the previous meeting. ROK took no position on this issue.

The Chair suggested, in an attempt to make progress, to separate in the discussions for the stationary target the cells B2 (early warning) and C2 (late warning)) and to do the same afterwards for the moving target.

In response, industry presented their proposal for flexibility for the moving target scenario (document AEBS/LDWS-19-05), indicating that they could accept a 0.8 sec value for the 1st warning provided this could done by optical means.

Moving target scenario

The Chair then suggested to discuss first the moving target scenario.

J could not accept the Industry proposal because they considered braking more important than the warning annoyance. J confirmed their support of the NL proposal.

For the moving target scenario in the Industry position, J could not accept “Optical only”.

NL could not accept optical only for the 1st warning. In the case of the moving target scenario the expert was of the opinion that the nuisance is not that critical.

F pointed out that the distance between the target and the subject vehicle with 1s TTC in the moving target scenario is 4m and proposed the 1st warning at 1.4 s and asked Industry about the driver’s acceptance with that limit (same as in Row 1).

D could support the Industry proposal.

ROK had no opinion but welcomed the flexibility of Industry.

The Chair considered that the discussions indicated some possibility of compromise about the warning timing for the moving target scenario (except from France)

F repeated their support for “optical only” but wanted 1.4 s warning time delay, with 0.8 s for the 2nd warning signal.

Mr. Clasen pointed out that long warning time would jeopardise the manufacturer’s wish to increase the speed reduction because the total time would then not be acceptable. OICA added that such warning time would question the speed reduction, in addition to the security margin and the vehicle dynamics. Also, Industry pointed out the fact that the regulation provides only the minimum values and provides freedom to the manufacturer to do better. One manufacturer gave the example of one of his production line, where 10% of the production are N2, the others are N1. The warning time at 0.8s would permit to use the N1 category AEBS system on the N2 vehicles, while forbidding this would make the AEBS too expensive.

F pointed out the EuroNCAP draft protocol of 1.2 s for driver’s reaction and could agree with this value of 1.2s.

It was stressed that EuroNCAP only addresses the M1 vehicles and that the protocol is still under discussion.

The Chair cautioned that the lack of flexibility by one Contracting Party would entail the risk that the informal group has to turn to its parent body, i.e. GRRF, for seeking guidance or even resolution on this technical matter.

F confirmed its position, and repeated to agree with 1.2 s for the 1st warning.

The Chair concluded by regretting that the informal group could not find a compromise for the warning time for the moving target scenario and announced his intention to request guidance from GRRF.

The Chair suggested to discuss the “optical only” 1st warning based on the assumption that a compromise could be later found for the value of warning time.

F confirmed the willing of 1.2s for the 1st signal.

OICA stressed that there is currently no experience of the system on these vehicles, and the need to get millions of kms with different drivers before making a decision on a possible compromise, in view of the risk to completely jeopardise the market confidence in this system.

The Chair therefore suggested asking guidance to GRRF on this issue as well.

Stationary target scenario

The group then started discussions on the stationary target scenario. The Chair recalled his proposal for a compromise for B2 and C2 cells, i.e. separating the values for the 1st warning from those for the 2nd warning.

OICA recalled their offer for flexibility for moving target scenario, and could not be more flexible for the stationary target scenario. The expert recalled the distance of 40 m in front of the target in case of a 0.8s warning time, in particular in view that the system is currently purely theoretical. The proposal is to amend the text such that the warning time is given BEFORE the start of the emergency braking phase. OICA was cautious in accepting an “optical only” warning in this case in view of the fact that the Contracting Parties did not accept the “optical only” for the moving target scenario.

NL found that the parameter for the stationary target scenario is the sensor recognition of a stationary target. NL recalled that a TTC of 1.8 sec provides at least 30m between the subject vehicle and the target. NL could accept optical only.

D supported the Chair’s proposal.

J could support 0.8s for the timing, and could not accept “optical only”.

F could accept the Chair’s proposal.

ROK could also support the Chair’s proposal.

OICA could not accept the J position, and was willing to have a further Industry internal consultation about the Chair’s proposal.

Temporary conclusion: no conclusive decision on warning times. See also item 5.2. below.

The agenda was adopted with no change.

The minutes were adopted with no change.

3. The expert from EC, chairing the informal group on Advanced Emergency Braking Systems (AEBS), reported on the progress made. He introduced GRRF-74-17 produced by the informal group and amending ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2011/93. Japan withdrew GRRF-74-20 and GRRF-74-21. GRRF adopted the proposal from the informal group, as reproduced in Annex II and requested the secretariat to submit the proposal to WP.29 and the Administrative Committee of the 1958 Agreement (AC.1) for consideration at their June 2013 sessions as draft Supplement 1 to the 01 series of amendments to UN Regulation No. [130]. GRRF noted the completion of the work by the informal group and acknowledged the work done by its experts.

1st day
The Chair reminded his recollection of the previous sessions that there is consensus on the speed reduction in the case of the stationary target scenario.

NL accepted this, at least for the 1st stage.

D, J, F and ROK agreed with the 10 km/h speed reduction as well.

Conclusion: agreement about the speed reduction in the case of the stationary target scenario.

For the moving target scenario, the Chair recalled the principle of a non-impact scenario.

All the Contracting Parties confirmed their agreement with the proposal, except France which abstained.

F found the Industry proposal of 67 km/h for the target vehicle speed not demanding enough and was keen to get a more severe performance requirement: the expert was of the opinion that the speed reduction is not related to the warning time, rather to the power of the brakes.

OICA recalled that the arguments valid for the warnings apply to the speed reductions.

The values proposed by OICA/CLEPA are based on tests performed at Jeversen (see AEBS/LDWS-18-03), and have scientific background. OICA was lacking flexibility on this.

The Chair invited the French representative be ready to present a consistent approach and arguments before the end of the 19th meeting. It would indeed be very difficult for GRRF to propose proper values to the experts group. Follow-up of this discussion can be found under item 5.5.

2nd day

The group reviewed the document proposed by the drafting group in order to simplify the number and quality of options to be presented to GRRF. The representative of NL found it essential that the issue of warning time be solved within the informal group in order to avoid increase of complexity of the options. He urged Industry to make efforts and be flexible. OICA recalled that 0.8 s would generate a warning 40 m before the target, and that for consistency in the driving information received by the driver, the criteria for the moving target scenario would have to follow the same logics.

It was recalled that the values are currently based on a 4m/s² deceleration, while the vehicles are usually able of 6 m/s². The Chair pointed out that the wording does not prevent the manufacturer to design the system such that other warning modes can be used for the 1st warning. J continued to believe that the warning is very important and could not change its position. F, D and ROK remained flexible.

OICA repeated that OICA could accept 0.8s provided that “optical only” is permitted in the stationary target scenario for the 1st warning. It was proposed that “optical only” remains in the stationary scenario for the 1st warning, but be deleted from the moving scenario.

After some further internal considerations, Industry agreed to remove the “optical only” warning for the 1st warning of the moving target scenario, with the hope that Japan could offer similar flexibility for the stationary target scenario.

J was ready to provide their position on this item on Tuesday 12 February 2013.

Conclusion: document as in Annex 1 to be updated on the 12th of February for tabling at GRRF.

Proposal from Germany regarding advanced emergency braking system specifications for the timing of warning modes, speed reduction and target speed for vehicles of category M2 and N2 ≤ 8 tonnes.

Germany presented the document AEBS/LDWS-18-02. The expert from Germany explained that Germany thought about asking more severe requirements, but then aligned the proposal on the OICA/CLEPA proposal. The expert summarized the justifications and stressed that the LPTS (Last Point To Steer) is usually at the same time as the LPTB (Last Point To Brake). Japan questioned the compatibility with the Vienna Convention, which would necessitate to request [1.4] latest time to warn before the automated emergency braking phase would start. The expert from D clarified that their proposal does not forbid warning earlier. The warning should be at the LPTS because up to that time it is still be possible for the driver to avoid the obstacle by steering. J was keen that there is some time between the start of the Emergency Braking phase and the warning.

CLEPA clarified that the Vienna Convention only requests the driver to be able to override the system. OICA clarified that the wording specifies “not later than”, permitting the system to warn before AEBS is taking the control.

NL was also in favour of a warning time before the automatic emergency braking system takes the control of the vehicle. The expert recalled that D was initially keen for a 2 second delay for the HCV. In addition, the N2 > 8T with pneumatic Braking System must already fulfil the warning time of row 1. The expert from the NL in addition recalled that OICA in p 16 of its presentation AEBS/LDWS-17-02-Rev.1 request 2s.

The Chair recalled one of the main principles in the adopted AEBS regulation, as specified in paragraph 5.5.1. that the timing of the warning signals shall be such that they provide the possibility for the driver to react to the risk of collision and take control of the situation and shall also avoid nuisance for the driver by too early or too frequent warnings. This principle requires both aspects to be taken into account.

OICA clarified that Industry gained experience in the meantime and could now justify the 1s TTC.

The Chair wondered whether using this 1s for warning the driver could be considered to find a common understanding on the warning timing issue.