GRVA-15-18
UN R155: Proposal for amendments to the Interpretation Document
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Proposal to improve the applicability of examples given in Tables A1 and B1 in Annex 5 in UN R155 regarding risks due to spoofing of messages or data received by the vehicle.
63. The expert from SAE International presented GRVA-15-46 and GRVA-15-18 related to a potential design restriction depending on the interpretation of Annex 5 to UN Regulation No. 155. He acknowledged the review of this matter by the IWG on CS/OTA but called on GRVA to reconsider this matter. He explained that cryptographical authentication may be a good solution to mitigate the spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals (e.g. V2X, GNSS messages), but that this example should not be listed before this technology was broadly deployed at production level.
64. The expert from ITU explained the technical matter again and reconfirmed that the technology was not yet deployed.
65. The expert from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland thought that there were some misunderstandings as UN Regulation No. 155 was not mandating any technology.
66. The expert from the United States of America recalled the points made so far: (a) the method listed was not available for use, (b) alternatives were not mentioned, and (c) other technology could reach the same level of performance.
67. The expert from the European Commission agreed to review this issue.
68. The expert from SAE International confirmed that the Regulation itself did not mandate the technology but he explained that in practice the example may become a requirement, as this already happened to a Tier 2 supplier.
69. GRVA agreed to resume consideration of this matter at its May 2023 session.
63. The expert from SAE International presented GRVA-15-46 and GRVA-15-18 related to a potential design restriction depending on the interpretation of Annex 5 to UN Regulation No. 155. He acknowledged the review of this matter by the IWG on CS/OTA but called on GRVA to reconsider this matter. He explained that cryptographical authentication may be a good solution to mitigate the spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals (e.g. V2X, GNSS messages), but that this example should not be listed before this technology was broadly deployed at production level.
64. The expert from ITU explained the technical matter again and reconfirmed that the technology was not yet deployed.
65. The expert from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland thought that there were some misunderstandings as UN Regulation No. 155 was not mandating any technology.
66. The expert from the United States of America recalled the points made so far: (a) the method listed was not available for use, (b) alternatives were not mentioned, and (c) other technology could reach the same level of performance.
67. The expert from the European Commission agreed to review this issue.
68. The expert from SAE International confirmed that the Regulation itself did not mandate the technology but he explained that in practice the example may become a requirement, as this already happened to a Tier 2 supplier.
69. GRVA agreed to resume consideration of this matter at its May 2023 session.